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ARTICLE 
ORIGINALISM AND LEGITIMACY:  
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR POWELL 
ROBERT J. DELAHUNTY* 
Originalism, as Professor Powell has just shown, is an answer to a 
question. At its core, originalism is an answer to a question about 
legitimacy. As an answer to a question of this constitutional magnitude, it 
has two aspects—jurisprudential and political. Professor Powell has rightly 
focused us on the jurisprudential side of the legitimacy question. In my 
brief remarks, I would like to call attention to the political side as well. 
The legitimacy question has a long history in American constitutional 
culture. It might be said to date back, in at least some form, to the early 
period of the Republic. To simplify, the question may first be posed as: how 
can constitutional review by the courts of actions by the political branches 
be shown to be consistent with American democracy? Marbury v. Madison 
can be read as an early answer to the question in this straightforward form.1 
Marbury’s answer is, very roughly, based on an analogy between the 
sovereign “People” and the federal government, and the principal-agent 
relationship. The People, as principal, has delegated the work of 
discharging its collective business (or much of it) to its agents, the three 
branches of the federal government. (This is broadly what it means for 
government to be “representative.”) But the costs to a principal of 
monitoring the actions of its agents—the problem of agency costs—can be 
prohibitive. As a practical matter, the People cannot be unremittingly 
“engaged” in political activity—there would be no civil society if it were. 
Elections can only be episodic and intermittent; mass mobilization and 
activism must, of necessity, be rare. To surmount the problem of agency 
costs, therefore, the People, in its Constitution, has designated one of its 
agents—the federal courts—to monitor the activities of the other two, so as 
to ensure that they exercise only the limited powers that the People has 
assigned to them. In discharging that function, the courts do not frustrate 
 
 *  
 1. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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the popular will—or at least the deeper popular will embodied in the 
Constitution—but give it continuing effect. Such is the (or an) argument of 
Marbury.  
The legitimacy question, as Professor Powell has argued, returned to 
center stage in the circumstances of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s: cases like 
Eisenstadt v. Baird posed the question in sharper and more urgent form.2 
The federal courts, charged with policing the political branches’ observance 
of constitutional limits, seemed to many to be transgressing the limits the 
Constitution had imposed on them. Marshall’s answer to the problem of 
agency costs had given rise to another problem: the difficulty of controlling 
the judicial agent. How was this agent to be policed, since it seemed beyond 
the power or will of the other branches to do so? (Judicial impeachments 
were not an available corrective.) The legitimacy question that originated in 
the 1960s had the two aspects—jurisprudential and political—mentioned 
above.  
First, the doctrinal underpinnings of cases like Eisenstadt seemed 
extremely weak. They seemed to be driven entirely by a form, indeed a 
rather crude form, of the prevailing legal realism.3 For decades before the 
1960s, legal realism had carried out a work of jurisprudential 
deconstruction. It had taught, in substance, that what had passed for legal 
reasoning was a sham. Judges did not base their decisions on legal 
doctrines, distilled from texts or precedents. Rather, they enacted policy 
preferences—preferences that were usually concealed, even from the judges 
themselves, by the façade of doctrinal formalism.4 As realism became more 
prevalent, it also became more unapologetic. Rather than purporting to 
reason their way to their conclusions from doctrinal premises, the courts 
more and more openly rested their decisions on naked policy choices. 
Originalism was offered by exponents like Raoul Berger5 and Robert 
Bork6 as a jurisprudential alternative to legal realism. (It was also offered as 
 
 2. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it 
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget 
a child.”); H. Jefferson Powell, On Not Being “Not an Originalist,” 7 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 259, 
268 (2010) 
 3. On the background of legal realism, see generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT 
YALE, 1927–1960 (1986). 
 4. There are many accounts of “formalism,” but in one formulation, the core of the idea is 
that law is autonomous, with its own distinctive principles, reasoning processes, and modes of 
establishing facts. See Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to 
Law and to the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2114–18 (2003). In another 
view, the core of formalism is “the concept of decisionmaking according to rule.” Frederick 
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988).  
 5. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). 
 6. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
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an alternative to the legal process teachings that were advocated by Justices 
like Felix Frankfurter7 and legal scholars like Alexander Bickel8—teachings 
that the early originalists considered ineffective in combating realism.9) 
Originalism (like legal process thought) was meant to affirm the critical, 
legitimizing distinction between legal reasoning (which courts do) and 
policy deliberation (which the elected branches do).10 Over and above that, 
however, originalism (in opposition to legal realism) was intended to 
provide the substantive premises from which the reasoning in constitutional 
cases should begin. Whatever the defects of originalism, it remains—as 
Professor Powell suggests at the end of his lecture11—a powerful counter or 
antidote to realism.  
Second, originalism had, and has, a political aspect. It is no accident 
that originalism is usually accompanied by belief in judicial “restraint” or 
 
 7. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. 
REV. 527 (1947). 
 8. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: 
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). For a marvelous appreciation of Bickel and the 
relationship of his thought to Frankfurter’s, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander M. Bickel and 
the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521 (1976). 
 9. For a survey of the work of the “legal process” school and its relationships to both 
realism and to originalism, see JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 47–66 (2005). 
 10. Justice Frankfurter expressed this idea in a manner that originalists would certainly find 
congenial. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119–20 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
What is always basic when the power of Congress to enact legislation is challenged is 
the appropriate approach to judicial review of congressional legislation. All power is, in 
Madison's phrase, “of an encroaching nature.” Federalist, No. 48 (Earle ed. 1937), at 
321. Judicial power is not immune against this human weakness. It also must be on 
guard against encroaching beyond its proper bounds, and not the less so since the only 
restraint upon it is self-restraint. When the power of Congress to pass a statute is 
challenged, the function of this Court is to determine whether legislative action lies 
clearly outside the constitutional grant of power to which it has been, or may fairly be, 
referred. In making this determination, the Court sits in judgment on the action of a co-
ordinate branch of the Government while keeping unto itself—as it must under our 
constitutional system—the final determination of its own power to act. No wonder such 
a function is deemed “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to 
perform.” Holmes, J., in Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148, 48 S.Ct. 105, 107, 72 
L.Ed. 206 (separate opinion). This is not a lip-serving platitude.  
  Rigorous observance of the difference between limits of power and wise exercise of 
power—between questions of authority and questions of prudence—requires the most 
alert appreciation of this decisive but subtle relationship of two concepts that too easily 
coalesce. No less does it require a disciplined will to adhere to the difference. It is not 
easy to stand aloof and allow want of wisdom to prevail, to disregard one's own 
strongly held view of what is wise in the conduct of affairs. But it is not the business of 
this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its 
own power, and this precludes the Court's giving effect to its own notions of what is 
wise or politic. That self-restraint is of the essence in the observance of the judicial 
oath, for the Constitution has not authorized the judges to sit in judgment on the 
wisdom of what Congress and the Executive Branch do. 
Id. at 119–20. 
 11. Powell, supra note 2, at 280. 
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opposition to judicial interventionism or “activism.” As a doctrine with a 
political aspect, originalism intends to reinvigorate the democratic political 
process. Originalism seeks to remit or restore decision-making to the 
electoral and legislative processes across a wide spectrum of cases—
especially in the area of social policy—in which law since the 1960s has 
been made by the federal courts. Much of the force and attractiveness of 
originalism, as I see it, derives from its tacit belief in the supremacy of 
politics over law in American constitutional democracy.  
Nonetheless, even if one acknowledges the interest and seriousness of 
originalism as a jurisprudential answer to legal realism (as Professor Powell 
does12) or finds it attractive for its potentially restorative effects on 
democratic politics (as I do), one might well decide (as Professor Powell 
has,13 and as I am inclined to do) to be, merely, not a non-originalist. 
Professor Powell has outlined a compelling jurisprudential case against pure 
originalism—a tendency that he, as a “conservative” American 
constitutionalist, regards as aberrant, impoverishing, utopian, and 
“radical.”14 I hope Professor Powell will not be in the least offended if I 
compare his view of the American Constitution to Jane Jacobs’ view of the 
American city.15 Just as Jacobs argued eloquently on behalf of teeming, 
vital, unplanned, and human-friendly urban spaces over the radical, 
simplified, and anti-humanist architecture of Le Corbusier, so Professor 
Powell embraces the eclectic, rich, complex, and polyphonous tradition of 
American constitutional and common law over the stark simplicities of the 
originalist project.  
But I think that merely not being a non-originalist will fail, in the end, 
to be a stable, defensible position. For one thing, the role of constitutional 
review in American public life has surely become far more pervasive than it 
was at the beginning of the Republic, or indeed at any time up to the 1960s. 
The federal courts have absorbed more and more of the responsibilities of 
general governance than was ever true in the past. Our courts manage 
prisons, set war policy, monitor public school curricula, and determine how 
confidential the relations between parents and their pregnant teenage 
daughters are to be. Were any of these ever counted among the courts’ 
traditional functions? I think that Professor Powell’s emphasis on the 
continuities of the American constitutional tradition16 tends to discount the 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 259. 
 14. Id. at 272. 
 15. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961). This 
enormously influential book is a critique of twentieth century “modernist” urban planning. Jacobs 
scathingly attacked reliance on deductive reasoning to find principles on which cities could be 
planned. One of her leading targets was the French planner Le Corbusier and his vision of a 
“Radiant City.” Id. at 21–24 (describing Le Corbusier’s “Radiant City”). 
 16. Powell, supra note 2, at 274. 
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importance of this vast expansion of the judicial role. Even in the longue 
durée, there can be profound change. 
Further, the problem is not merely the courts’ assumption of 
untraditional roles that draw them deep into the sphere of the political: at a 
deeper level, the question is whether the tradition to which legal process 
theory appealed even survives. According to Robert Bork—Alexander 
Bickel’s close friend and colleague—Bickel himself was inclined to 
conclude that it had not: 
[Bickel] counted on a judicial tradition of modesty, intellectual 
coherence, the morality of process, to make judicial supremacy 
possible. Those traits have often been lacking on the Court and 
[Bickel] felt they may have been damaged beyond repair by the 
Warren Court. We have never had a rigorous theory of judicial 
restraint; for a time we had a tradition; now that is almost gone.17 
Where does that leave us, if we are neither originalists nor, altogether, 
non-originalists? That would be a proper theme for a law review article of a 
thousand footnotes. But let me at least indicate where I would go.  
In the Carolene Products footnote, Chief Justice Stone planted a seed 
whose full growth, I believe, has still to be seen.18 The New Deal Court had 
broken decisively (or so the legend has it19) with the Old Court: a youthful 
legal realism had displaced a worn-out legal formalism, and the democratic 
energies released by Franklin Roosevelt had swept away the constitutional 
structures in which the “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse”20 on the Court 
had barricaded themselves. But as Stone shrewdly saw, the Court could not 
confine itself to rubber-stamping the outcomes of the political process. It 
had a vital, in fact indispensable, role to play in American public life. It 
could at least help to ensure that the political process worked honestly and 
efficiently. It could protect robust speech; it could shelter disenfranchised or 
permanently outvoted minorities; it could purify and vitalize democracy in 
ways that the political branches could not. (Seen in this light, Brown v. 
Board is not a doubtful decision—as it must be for originalists21—but a 
 
 17. ROBERT H. BORK, The Legacy of Alexander M. Bickel, in A TIME TO SPEAK: SELECTED 
WRITINGS AND ARGUMENTS 684, 690 (2008).  
 18. The claim that the Carolene Products footnote might still provide new directions for 
constitutional jurisprudence was expounded by Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718 (1985). Ackerman argued, correctly in my view, that the core ideas of 
the footnote would need to be rethought to fit contemporary circumstances. 
 19. For a revisionist perspective, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL 
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998). For a post-revisionist 
view, see Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. 
REV. 1052 (2005). 
 20. For further information on the “Four Horsemen,” see THE SUPREME COURT: THE 
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 246–48 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005). 
 21. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947 (1995); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
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necessary and ineluctable one.) I do not think that either the committed 
originalists on today’s Supreme Court, or the committed non-originalists 
(possibly excepting Justice Breyer) see the judicial role in this light. But I 
think that it may be time to close the debate on originalism, and turn the 
constitutional conversation in this direction instead.  
I can give here only the briefest sketch of how a Carolene Products-
based theory could change the ways in which constitutional cases are 
argued and decided. Let me give two recent examples. This Term’s major 
campaign finance case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,22 
featured a skirmish between Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia over the 
“original understanding” of the First Amendment with regard to corporate 
speech. Justice Stevens sought to show that the Framers “took it as a given 
that corporations could be comprehensively regulated in the service of the 
public welfare.”23 He did, however, hedge his conclusions, saying that “[t]o 
the extent that the Framers’ views are discernible and relevant to the 
disposition of this case, they would appear to cut strongly against the 
majority’s position.”24 Justice Scalia responded that “modern corporations 
might not qualify for exclusion [from First Amendment protection]. Most of 
the Founders’ resentment towards corporations was directed at the state-
granted monopoly privileges that individually chartered corporations 
enjoyed.”25 While both Justices seemed to think that the discussion of the 
Framers’ views of corporations was something of a distraction, they both 
devoted a substantial part of their opinions to considering those views—the 
effect, no doubt, of originalism. But the question of what the Framers would 
make of the speech rights of the modern business corporation—even if one 
could give a plausible answer to it—is of little use in deciding a case such 
as this. On the Carolene Products approach, however, the central issues 
would be framed in a more direct and probing way: Does the Congressional 
ban on the use of corporate or union general treasury funds to make certain 
“electioneering communications” within set periods before a primary or an 
election protect the political process from the distorting effects of corporate 
wealth? Or is the statute instead a device for sheltering incumbent office-
holders from vigorous electoral competition, or for tilting the field in favor 
of the major media corporations as against other corporate entities? The 
central focus of the Court’s review would thus be on whether the statute 
tends to open up or constrict the political process.  
The pending litigation over California’s “Proposition 8” provides 
 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The 
Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995). 
 22. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 23. Id. at 949–50 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 24. Id. at 948 (emphasis added). 
 25. Id. at 926 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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another example. Did California voters violate the federal Constitution by 
adopting a State constitutional amendment recognizing only marriages 
between a man and a woman?26 Viewing the issue through the Carolene 
Products prism, the resolution of the case would largely turn on whether the 
class of homosexuals constitutes something similar to a “discrete and 
insular minority”? More exactly, the question would become whether that 
group suffers from some kind of inherent liability in the political process 
that marginalizes or isolates it, thus disenabling it from forming part of an 
electoral coalition that has a fair chance of winning victories in matters of 
concern to that group?27 (The Supreme Court may have assumed so in its 
otherwise opaque decision in the Romer case.28) In answering that question, 
the Court could evaluate such matters as the amount and sources of the 
expenditures on both sides of the issue in the California ballot initiative.29 It 
could also consider the views of some public choice theorists that small, 
homogeneous groups may be disproportionately powerful in political 
campaigns.30 Once again, the focus of constitutional review would be on 
eliminating structural flaws in the democratic process. I leave with the 
question: Is this not a better answer to the problem of legitimacy than either 
originalism or legal process theory?  
 
 
 26. See Wikipedia.org, California Proposition 8 (2008), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
California_Prop_8 (last visited March 23, 2010). 
 27. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1015 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[H]omosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority 
of this country's population. Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested 
against homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless 
to pursue their rights openly in the political arena.”). For an argument that homosexuality should 
be a suspect class, but not because of political powerlessness, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM 
DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION & CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 117–18 (2010). 
 28. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996). 
 29. The campaigns for and against Proposition 8 raised $39.9 million and $43.3 million, 
respectively. Contributions totaled over $83 million from over 64,000 people in all fifty states and 
more than twenty foreign countries, setting a new record nationally for a social policy initiative 
and trumping every other race in the country in spending except the presidential contest.  
Wikipedia.org, California Proposition 8 (2008), supra note 26. 
 30. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 127 (2d ed. 1971). 
